

Research Note

A Note on Affinities between Gramscian Hegemony and Weberian Legitimacy —Consideration from a Viewpoint of Dominants and Subordinates—

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1. Introduction

In the current society, the English language and western ways of culture, especially that of the United States, are globally spreading. It can be inferred that there are not only the power of the language and culture, but also a certain degree of acceptance by the people who receive those dominance in the background of the expansion. In other words, the dominative structure is not only sustained by the power itself, but also people become a part of the structure and support an expanding of the domination. Simply put, it is maintained by people's positive attitude. Then, the concern is how people find the domination valid; in other words, what kind of the relationships are there between the domination and their agreement.

In order to discuss the power relationships—the structure of domination and its acceptance—, this study especially focuses on two outstanding concepts in sociology: hegemony and legitimacy conceptualized by Antonio Gramsci for the former and Max Weber for the latter. Both Gramsci and Weber as contemporaries experienced some social changes and events, namely progression of industrialization, technology and science, the World War I, and the political struggles and revolutions in Russia and Germany; both of them “tried to make sense of the massive changes which they saw occurring, and of the history which had led to those changes” (Sass, 2014, p. 2). Furthermore, they are “two of the

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most prominent political and social theorists of their time, whose influences is still felt strongly today, and so it is worth examining these affinities” (“Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci, 2007, p. 1”). Although the two are scarcely compared since they have very different ideas, they have similar points regarding the significance of consent in the legitimacy of domination or hegemony if we examine them closely. This study, therefore, tries to find some similarities between them regarding legitimacy on domination.

First of all, this study introduces Gramscian notion of hegemony especially looking at how he theorized the concept from his own perspectives: namely, a political society, a civil society, and the intellectuals. Then, this study explains Weberian perspective of legitimacy especially taking his thoughts on domination and its validity into consideration. Finally, regarding their unique perspectives on the power structure, this study tries to figure out some affinities between Gramscian notion of hegemony and Weberian perspective of legitimacy in order to grasp how subordinates find domination valid.

2. Hegemony

This study first tries to grasp the meaning of hegemony by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), in order to see the relationship between dominants and subordinates under the power relationships. Looking back in the history of the concept, although hegemony originally means domination in Greek, an Italian political thinker, Secretary General of the Italian communist party, Antonio Gramsci, develops hegemony in the early 20th century¹⁾. Briefly mentioned, the way he treats the concept is domination from a government plus consent from civil people; the situation where something acquires an affirmative agreement—what he called *spontaneous consent*—. His notion of hegemony comes from two ideas. One is the relationship of a *political society*, a *civil society*, and *the intellectuals*, and the other is Americanism and Fordism (i.e. standardization and disciplinization).

The term, hegemony, generally means supremacy, a leadership or a political leading position in Greek. Katagiri (2002) described the concept: “The

word, hegemony, is derived from the Greek word, *hegesthai*. It originally means to lead, to guide, or to be a leader. It referred to domination of a country" (pp. 111-112). Williams (1977) similarly explained it: "The traditional definition of 'hegemony' is political rule or domination, especially in relations between states" (p. 108)². Robinson (1996) acknowledged that the concept of hegemony is not generally used in the Gramscian sense in the social science; but "The commonplace usage refers broadly to domination, rooted in the original Greek meaning of hegemony as predominance of one nation over another" (p. 21).

Although it fundamentally means domination in Greek, Marxism extended the concept to relations between social classes, especially to definitions of a ruling class. Then, Gramsci went further the definition in which the concept acquired more significant sense (Williams, 1977). As Robinson (1996) described, his notion of hegemony is "more circumscribed, positing distinct *forms*, or relations, of domination, in brief: *coercive domination* and *consensual domination*" (p. 21).

As is mentioned, Gramsci is well known as one of the greatest political thinkers of all time. At his time, Mussolini arrested him because of his intelligence; he continued his study on various subjects. While he was prisoned, he wrote and left a lot of materials; his collective writings are known as "Prison Notebooks"³. He used the concept of hegemony not only in the Notebooks, but also in a lot of memos on his thoughts. He never defined exactly what hegemony mean in his notes or memos; therefore, his work was scattered very much⁴. Since he used hegemony in diverse studies, his notion of hegemony is not always coherent. Hoare and Smith (1971) acknowledged that the contents of Gramsci's *Quaderni del carcere* or the Notebooks are complex because of two factors: one is "the fragmentary character of the writing themselves"; and the other is "the uncertain status of the Notebooks in Gramsci's intentions" (p. x). Williams (1977) while admitted that "his work is one of the major turning-points in Marxist cultural theory"; "Much is still uncertain in Gramsci's use of the concept" (p. 108).

Gramsci, in fact, took up Marx's claim that:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its

ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance (Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 64).

Gramsci expanded this claim because he tried “to develop a clearer understanding of the mechanisms of historical struggles over domination and leadership” (Sass, 2014, p. 9). He treated hegemony as “the supremacy of a social group(s) as ideological domination (“Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci”, 2007, p. 4)”. Likewise, Robinson (1996) pointed out that “The Gramscian concept of hegemony as “consensual domination” exercised in civil and political society at the level of the individual nation (or national society) may be extended/applied to the emergent of global civil and political society” (p. 6).

Ito (1993) pointed out that there are three phases existed in his theory: (1) “dichotomy between a civil society and a political society or the state; a perspective of dichotomy between hegemony and coercion for each society”; (2) “treating the concept of hegemony as a combination of coercion plus consent, and carrying the concept through the state and a civil society”; (3) “exercising hegemony in the state in which a political society and a civil society are comprised” (p. 168). Similarly, Hoare and Smith (1971) mentioned that “the term “hegemony” in Gramsci itself has two faces”: one is “contrasted with “domination””; the other is “hegemonic”. Hegemonic is sometimes used as “an opposite of “corporate” or “economic-corporate” to designate an historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena” (p. xiv).

It is obvious that this study focuses on the second phase: hegemony as “a

combination of coercion plus consent". As is mentioned, before him, hegemony is considered mainly as "a dictatorship", "a leadership", "domination", or "coercion" originated with the Greek meaning of the word; Gramsci added the aspect of "consent" to these dimensions, and this is the greatest feature of his notion of hegemony.

Gramsci used hegemony for analyzing not domination by law or economy but as a leadership⁵⁾ or consent. He wrote the relationship between hegemony and democracy in his Note on Machiavelli⁶⁾:

Of the many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and concrete one in my view can be worked out in relation to the concept of 'hegemony'. In the hegemonic system, there exists democracy between the 'leading' group and the groups which are 'led', in so far as the development of the economy and thus the legislation which expresses such development favour the (molecular) passages from the 'led' groups to the 'leading' group (Hoare and Smith, 1971, p. 56).

In this point, Bates (1975) stated that "The concept of hegemony...means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class" (p. 352). Similarly, his notion of hegemony can be defined as "a relation between classes in which one class or fraction of a class exercises leadership over other classes and strata by gaining their *active consent*" (Robinson, 1996, p. 21).

He not only emphasized an importance of a leadership, consent, or education for material dominance and coercion, but also stressed that an ideology or hegemony functions in this field in order to acquire consent from subordinate or subaltern⁷⁾ by means of various mediums. A very significance in his conception of hegemony is, thus, a power in a moral or an intention decision making; the power is not simply coercion or domination, but it is consent or a leadership (Kaneyama, 2009). Gramsci (1971) mentioned that "the 'normal' exercise of hegemony ... is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally"; "force will appear to be based on the consent of

the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion—newspapers and associations—which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied” (p. 80)⁸.

Since then, this *Gramscian notion of hegemony* has been explained in many ways. Hegemony is “an act of seeking consensus not by enforcement but by persuasion” in addition to a political or cultural leadership (Kurosawa, 2008, p. 35); in short, it means “acquirement of consent without enforcement” (Ibid, p. 94). What Gramsci made apparent in his Note is that the important momentum of hegemony is intellectual or moral leadership or cultural or educational leadership in a broad sense. “Superiority of any social group is embodied by two configurations: domination and moral or cultural leadership” (Matsuda and Ohara, 2005, p. 89). Ekers et al. (2009) explained that, for Gramsci, hegemony means “the ability of a ruling bloc to exercise leadership and control over subordinated social groups” (p. 289). It is achieved through “not only a union of economic and political aims, but also intellectual moral unity” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 182).

In fact, Gramsci (1971) wrote the supremacy of a social group is manifested in two ways: one is domination and the other is intellectual and moral leadership. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, and this tends to “liquidate” or to “subjugate” (p. 57). This idea can be found in an earlier draft of 1920-30, note on the Risorgimento. There he mentioned “a class is dominant in two ways, i.e. ‘leading’ and ‘dominant’. ... even before attaining power a class can (and must) ‘lead’; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but continues to ‘lead’ as well” (Hoare and Smith, 1971, p. 56-57). Robinson (1996) explained that his hegemony concerns “the internationalization on the part of subordinate classes of the moral and cultural values, the codes of practical conduct, and the worldview of the dominant classes or groups – in sum, the internationalization of the *social logic* of the system of domination itself” (p. 21).

Taking these arguments into consideration, Gramscian notion of hegemony can be treated as follows: Dominant groups rarely use force or power alone but use various attempts to get intellectual or moral leadership in addition to the force and the power in order to acquire consent from subordinate or subaltern; as

a result, subordinates take the domination for granted and show their consent toward the domination. Therefore, the concept of hegemony is synonymous with *spontaneous consent*.

3. Legitimacy

Secondly, in order to understand the relationship between legitimacy and validity of the structure and people's positive attitude toward this authority system, this study will review the concept of legitimacy developed by Max Weber (1864-1920)⁹. He is well known as one of the most famous sociologists in history¹⁰; he is also known for his extraordinary analyses of the relationship between power or authority and the legitimacy or validity of the domination generated from/attribution to it. Although he distinguished the ideal types of legitimate political leadership, domination, and authority, he expansively used the concept of legitimacy in many parts of his work.

This study, however, focuses on the very core of his thought on how subordinates find themselves legitimate. Simply stated, how he looks the concept is more from the side of subjects, and the fundamental base of legitimacy comes from *Three Types of Legitimate Rule* (or *Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft* in German) appeared in one of his outstanding works, *Economy and Society* (the original work is named *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*). In short, the three types are: (1) Rational-Legal; (2) Traditional; (3) Charismatic, and for him, these types are the root for the power relations between ruler and subject; as is expressed in his term, "to begin with, in principle there are three inner justifications, hence basic legitimations of domination" (Weber, 1946, p. 78).

Even though his notion of legitimacy is the thing of decades ago, the concept has been used especially in the field of sociology. Beetham (1991) mentioned that his typology of legitimate 'Herrschaft' "has provided the basis for the treatment of legitimacy in twentieth century sociology and political science", and actually it is "fundamentally flawed as a basis for analyzing political legitimacy, and especially the legitimacy of the modern state" (p. 34)¹¹. Bensman (2015) similarly believed that "perhaps the most widely accepted of all his many contributions to

political science, sociology, and the social and historical sciences in general” (p. 325).

First of all, it should be noted that Weber (1978) believed that domination is a significant element of social action:

Domination in the most general sense is one of the most important elements of social action. Of course, not every form of social action reveals a structure of dominancy. But in most of the varieties of social action domination plays a considerable role, even where it is not obvious at first sight. ... Without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy (p. 941).

However, Weber thought that in order to domination to be legitimate, it needed to be willingly accepted; which, in other words, is to be regarded as a valid norm (Parkin, 2002). As Bensman (2015) similarly explained, “Weber, in adapting and defining the concept and making it central to much of his political sociology, focused on *the voluntaristic elements* in legitimacy” (p. 326, emphasis added). This conceptualization of domination appeared in one of the chapters in his writings, *Economy and Society*, under the title of *The Basis of Legitimacy*¹². Weber (1978) defined it at the opening section of the chapter:

Domination was defined ...as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons. It thus does not include every mode of exercising “power” or “influence” over other persons. Domination (“authority”) in this sense may be based on the most diverse motives of compliance: all the way from simple habituation to the most purely rational calculation of advantage. Hence every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience (p. 212).

For Weber, however, the concept of legitimacy is defined as justification of

domination (i.e. his term legitimacy is a synonym for justification); it is the means of justifying domination. He mentioned it in various places, for instance: "Indeed, the continued exercise of every domination always has the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of its legitimation" (Weber, 1978, p. 954); "For a domination, this kind of justification of its legitimacy is much more than a matter of theoretical or philosophical speculation; it rather constitutes the basis of very real differences in the empirical structure of domination" (Ibid, p. 953); and most concisely, "in principle there are three inner justifications, hence basic legitimations of domination" (Weber, 1946, p. 78).

In order to acquire this domination, authority or rule, Weber asserted the necessity of supporters who sustain this structure. He believed that "custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is normally a further element, *the belief in legitimacy*" (p. 213, emphasis added). His concept of legitimacy is originally appeared in a part of the writings, and here, "he comes close to defining *legitimacy* in his first use of the term under the concept of legitimate order" (Bensman, 2015, p. 326). This way of thinking is clearly mentioned in his writing:

Action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order. The probability that action will actually be so governed will be called the "validity" of the order in question. Thus, the validity of an order means more than the mere existence of a uniformity of social action determined by custom or self-interest. ... when a civil servant appears in his office daily at a fixed time, he does not act only on the basis of custom or self-interest which he could disregard if he wanted to; as a rule, his action is also determined by the validity of an order (viz., the civil service rules), which he fulfills partly because disobedience would be disadvantageous to him but also because its violation would be abhorrent to his sense of duty (of course, in varying degrees) (Weber, 1978, p. 31).

Bensman (2015) explained the way Weber thought upon the validity of legitimate norms more clearly:

The *validity* of a set of legitimate norms ... rests on the *voluntary obedience* of a follower, a disciple, or official to a leader, tradition, or legal code. While legitimacy may exist to support a system of domination or political order, others' motives, pure expediency, or responses to naked coercion may also sustain that order (p. 327).

Here, one of the keys to understanding Weber's conception is the idea of "voluntary obedience", which implies that the validity of the legitimate norm is based not only on the dominators or rulers but also on the consent or voluntarily obedience of the subordinates or subjects. Bensman (2015) additionally mentioned "legitimacy produces moral, *willing obedience*, work, and productivity" (p. 366, emphasis added), and hence, one of the outputs of legitimacy is 'obedience'. Beetham (1991) states that Weber, in fact, defines 'Herrschaft' as "a relationship of *command and obedience*, such that those subordinate to it can be expected to carry out an instruction regardless of its content" (p. 35, emphasis added)¹³. Weber therefore does not focus on how dominants, authorities, or rulers dominate but focuses on examining subordinates, inferiors, or subjects, thus showing how they are dominated and how they legitimize or justify this domination.

4. Affinities between Gramsci's Hegemony and Weber's Legitimacy

Before comparing similarities between what Gramsci and Weber believed, it should be noted in terms of their works that "Both Weber's and Gramsci's writings are extensive, multi-layered and complex" (Sass, 2014, p. 14). Although both of the *giants'* interests are miscellaneous and wide-ranging, we can find some affinities between Gramsci and Weber if we compare them especially with the viewpoint of the way how dominative situation is structured. For instance,

one of the affinities between them is that “they both emphasize the importance of agency” (Sass, 2014, p. 14). In other words, both of them were “active and working in what has been described as the age of transformation from a civil-bourgeois society to a mass society” (“Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci”, 2007, p. 1). Simply put, they did not so much focus on how dominants dominate subordinates, but rather they did focus on how subordinates find the domination valid. As is mentioned, for Gramsci, the base is the concept of hegemony; for Weber, the core is the notion of legitimacy.

As is discussed, Gramscian notion of hegemony is not only based on force or coercion; similar to what Weber has described the structure of domination. Hegemony not only exists as a theoretical idea, but also it can be found in or closely related to our everyday life. In our society, it is not only remained in an ideological level, but also existed as more practical figure in the daily life (Yoshimi, 2001). What Gramsci focused on is that “the central challenge for a hegemonic group is to create consensus and agreement to their rule among as many people as possible, or as Weber had said: legitimacy” (Sass, 2014, p. 10). In this regard, Ekers et al. (2009) believed that “At a very basic – but important – level, hegemony gives us a convenient vocabulary for understanding why people consent to, and participate in, relationships that are fundamentally unjust” (p. 289). Therefore, hegemony is not existed by itself, but it is rather ‘activated’ by people who confront the structure of hegemony.

Gramsci considered hegemony as consent from subordinates—spontaneous consent—. He considered hegemony as “the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). This spontaneity is a very fundamental part of his notion of hegemony in terms especially of looking it from a role of subordinates. He mentioned:

The maximum of legislative capacity can be inferred when a perfect formulation of directives is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of execution and verification, and by a perfect preparation of the “spontaneous” consent of the masses who must “live” those

directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, their own convictions to conform with those directives and with the objectives which they propose to achieve (p. 266).

His conception of hegemony focuses on the relationship between the dominant class and the subordinates, force and consent. Therefore, “if the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading”, but only “dominant”, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 275-276). In this sense, “Hegemony thus concerns both the legitimacy of a social group’s position of power and the diffusion and adoption of a set of ideologies and social relationships” (Ekers et al., 2009, p. 289).

Since Weber defined domination as “the chance that a specific group of people will react with obedience to an order”, he held the thought that “there needs to be some kind of interest to obey on the part of the individuals”. In addition, all kinds of stable authority needed legitimacy, which pointed towards a dialectical relationship connecting the ruler and the ruled, dominants and subordinates (Sass, 2014, p. 6). When legitimacy is successfully made, it “allows for a honing in on the nature of relationships based on consent and coercion” (Jeffrey et al., 2015, p. 179). Therefore, legitimacy will come into existence when ‘demand and supply’ from dominants and subordinates successfully be compromised. In other words, legitimacy can be validated when the relationship between coercion from dominants and consent from subordinates is well-balanced.

The concept of legitimacy by Weber, however, “contributes to a system of social controls that lowers the economic and military *costs of domination*”, and when an underlying population is induced to accept or believe in the claims, promises, and justifications of a system of legitimacy, the dominant classes can reduce “*the cost of coercion*” (Bensman, 2015, p. 358, emphasis added). Also, he believed that every ruling class or strata asserts legitimacy. They try to establish a political myth, ideology, or political formula, all of which justifies their political

and social status. If a society successfully produces legitimacy as belief, its motivation, productivity, and efficiency can increase, while reducing “*the costs of control*” (Bensman, 2015, p. 359, emphasis added)¹⁴. Here, he mentioned that costs of control, domination or coercion can be reduced from the side of rulers by means of a systematic legitimacy. In other words, followers or subordinates voluntarily support to sustain dominant structure, and thus dominants pay less effort to maintain the structure; and this point can be one of the similarities of Gramscian hegemony.

When domination proceeds with some factors, those factors sometimes fulfill a societal need. Then, coercive domination will change into the domination with spontaneous consent or belief in the domination. Whether the cause of the change is factitive by rulers or a natural change in social conditions, dominants constitute the dominative structure accompanied with spontaneous consent from subordinates. Here, it looks as if there are no coercion and force, but the consent is inevitable consequence. In other words, the key for understanding this structure of domination, and hence one of the similar characteristics between hegemony and legitimacy, is that the structure of how people are dominated or obeyed¹⁵. In fact, according to Spiro (1999), he confirmed that “the ‘golden period’ of hegemony is one of legitimate authority” and mentioned that “the leading power is bounded by the precepts of social purpose that it instituted at the start of its rule. It lets the system work because legitimate rule makers future authority *less costly*” (p. 156). Therefore, in a way, this system of domination can be considered as having efficiency; literally, it is an *economic* way of domination in which dominants do not need a lot of effort but acquires consensual domination with a little effort.

If we take all these theories and arguments into consideration, both hegemony and legitimacy traced in this study can be identified as an indispensable apparatus for justification or ‘validation’ of any domination mechanism¹⁶. As is discussed, both of them are focusing on how subordinates find themselves valid or make sense the structure of domination; therefore, dominant structure is successfully constructed without territorial domination or colonization that dominants simply dominate with coercion or enforcement by

arms and swords that world-widely happened in the 18th or the 19th century. Unlike the past, this ways of dominant structure is not 'compelling' but 'supportive' because of its nature. Instead of simply using these armed-forces, dominants attempt to utilize linguistic and cultural based power in order to acquire acceptance from subordinates in the current society. In this circumstance, subordinates take the dominant situation for granted, and this is what Gramsci mentioned *spontaneous consent* and Weber believed *voluntary obedience* from subordinates. Both of them less costly achieve and establish dominative structure because subordinates themselves agree on the establishment of the structure.

5. Conclusion

In order to see the power relationship between dominants and subordinates—how subordinates find the domination valid—this study focused on two most outstanding concepts in Sociological theory: Hegemony by Antonio Gramsci and Legitimacy by Max Weber. As this study has indicated, there are certain affinities between Gramscian notion of hegemony and Weberian perspective of legitimacy, although these concepts from the two giants are rarely compared. From their viewpoints, the factors that make sense and sustain the power relationship were not only force or coercion brought from dominants, but also subordinates' consent toward or belief in the domination attributed to the maintenance of the relationship. In fact, as is implied and suggested through the thoughts from Gramsci and Weber, what subordinates think valid is more important than what dominants bring to them in the structure of successive domination. It should be noted, however, that nothing makes subordinates to consent or believe. In order to achieve and successfully build legitimate domination, dominants need carefully to concern how they convince or persuade subordinates; and therefore, they utilize diverse strategies to let subordinates attracted.

If we consider about the spreading of the English language and culture in a globalized or globalizing world in a progressive tense, these are not only

expanding with the power of themselves, but also people receive and accept them with positive attitude. In other words, if we put it differently along with what we have considered in this study, not only dominants—the power of the English language and culture— (i.e. those from the United States) have a power to dominate, but rather, subordinates—people who positively receive them— find them valid in the structure of domination.

Since English domination has been broadened and is still growing in a worldwide scale, the boundary between dominants and subordinates has become more and more blurred. One of the main reasons for the fuzziness is that people who are once in a subordinate position possibly be in the next dominant position; and this circulation goes round and round and may not be stopped unless we consider the factor behind the power of the domination¹⁷⁾. People tend to be trapped by dogma of English domination as the dominants attempt to attract them by various methods¹⁸⁾; and they likely find its validity in the Gramscian notion of hegemony or in the Weberian perspective of legitimacy when they encounter the domination. Because they are not forced to or coerced into but *spontaneously consent* or *willingly obey* the domination, it is not easy to free them from it. Therefore, to look at how subordinates find the domination valid by standing at their point of view is crucial for finding the factors behind English domination because, as Nakano (1996) mentioned, formerly, the relationship between dominants and subordinates seems more apparent; yet the relationship between them becomes much vague nowadays because of current changes of our societies and ourselves in the global world. Simply mentioned, the structure of domination has become more ambiguous entity. Therefore, the meaning of legitimacy of domination, or in other words, the argument for what makes the structure of domination legitimate or validate is necessary.

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- ¹⁾ His life time is well summarized in Ekers, Loftus, & Mann (2009), especially pp. 287-288.
- ²⁾ Historically, hegemony has used mainly in the field of politics (e.g., Matsuda and Ohara (2005) pointed out its significance). However, it nowadays has been used and studies in diverse ways in many kinds of fields. Especially after the 1970s, the theory of Gramsci including his hegemony theory is spotlighted internationally and applied in diverse areas. For example, Ito (1993) mentioned that his theory is used in the field of Marxism, politics and sociology, literature and theater theory, media and communication theory; therefore, this theory is a sort of common property. Kurosawa (2008) pointed out that the theory affected ideological state apparatuses by Althusser; discourse theory by Foucault; Poulantzas and Laclau; Apple and Giroux in education. An international economist, Cox (1993), stated that Gramsci did not mention the international relationships directly, but his thoughts are useful for understanding the meaning of international organizations and hegemony is especially important out of the thoughts. Qi (2004) expressed that hegemony is applied in the field of education. Kaneyama (2009) expressed that a series of Gramsci's theory widely affects the 20th century social science.
- ³⁾ From here, Gramsci's “Prison Notebooks” is abbreviated as “the Notebooks”.
- ⁴⁾ For this reason, this study does a little reference to Gramsci's original works, but rather rests on other scholars' works referring to his conception of hegemony.
- ⁵⁾ One of Gramsci's terminologies, “leadership”, is originally written as “direzione” in Italy; however, because his terminology is difficult to translate, this study follows what Hoare and Smith (1971) have translated.
- ⁶⁾ The original note is Gramsci (1949). This study uses English translations of the note according to Hoare and Smith (1971). In fact, Gramsci described the relationship between authority and hegemony, force and consent, by using the analogy of Machiavelli's Centaur (Sassoon, 1980).
- ⁷⁾ According to Hoare and Smith (1971), “subordinate”, “subaltern” or sometimes “instrumental” means “non-hegemonic groups or classes” for Gramsci (p. xiv).
- ⁸⁾ For original text, see Gramsci (1949).
- ⁹⁾ For some helpful explanations on his lifetime, see Weber (1975) or Introduction in Miller (1963).
- ¹⁰⁾ For example, Yamakawa and Ogasawara (2011) referred to some texts, and described

Weber as “A Giant of Social Science”; “A Giant of Modern Social Science”; “The Greatest Social Scientist of the Twentieth Century”; “The Greatest Sociologist in the World”; or “The Father of Modern Sociology who influences a lot on Humanities and Social Science of the Twentieth Century”.

- ¹¹⁾ He also emphasizes that his repetition of the typology in several different contexts is “evidence of the importance of the categories to all the major areas of his sociology – economic, religious and political – and of the general significance of the phenomenon of ‘Herrschaft’ to all three” (Beetham, 1991, p. 35).
- ¹²⁾ Here in this study, the translation version of Weber (1978) is used as a reference.
- ¹³⁾ Here, he actually refers to Weber’s text in 1972. See Weber (1972) for the original text written in German.
- ¹⁴⁾ Similar argument can be found in Bensman (2015): “any system of legitimacy implies a political theory, an ideology, a political myth, or formulae, a theoretical system that gives substantive content and consistency to its particular claims, promises, or justifications” (p. 362).
- ¹⁵⁾ In fact, for Weber, “questions of stability, or in degrees of legitimacy, or in the contrast between legitimate and non-legitimate ‘Herrschaft’” were not his primary concern, but what he was interested in lies elsewhere: “in the ground or principle on which legitimacy is claimed, and the consequences which follow for the form of organization of ‘Herrschaft’, regardless of the degree to which that claim is actually acknowledged” (Beetham, 1991, p. 36).
- ¹⁶⁾ Nakatani (2007) discussed the ideological functions and mechanisms for justification especially looking at hegemony.
- ¹⁷⁾ This circulation or reproduction of English hegemony has discussed in Yoshida and Takatori (2014).
- ¹⁸⁾ Language and culture brought with the spreading of English, which means American culture, mainly attract them. Moreover, using the latest technology or modern civilized society from the United States may be more convenient and reasonable than living a country life in keeping with a traditional or uncivilized lifestyle. Even the things, that people refer to as “American ways of life”, have spread around the world. For example, American pop songs, Starbucks and MacDonald, Hollywood movies, and U.S. companies are everywhere.